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Abstract   There is a growing threat to the cyber-security of safety-critical sys-
tems.   The introduction of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software, including 
Linux, specialist VOIP applications and Satellite Based Augmentation Systems 
across the aviation, maritime, rail and power-generation infrastructures has cre-
ated common, vulnerabilities.  In consequence, more people now possess the tech-
nical skills required to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in safety-critical sys-
tems.   Arguably for the first time there is the potential for cross-modal attacks 
leading to future ‘cyber storms’.  This situation is compounded by the failure of 
public-private partnerships to establish the cyber-security of safety critical appli-
cations.  The fiscal crisis has prevented governments from attracting and retain-
ing competent regulators at the intersection of safety and cyber-security. In par-
ticular, we argue that superficial similarities between safety and security have led 
to security policies that cannot be implemented in safety-critical systems. Existing 
office-based security standards, such as the ISO27k series, cannot easily be inte-
grated with standards such as IEC61508 or ISO26262.  Hybrid standards such as 
IEC 62443 lack credible validation.   There is an urgent need to move beyond 
high-level policies and address the more detailed engineering challenges that 
threaten the cyber-security of safety-critical systems.  In particular, we consider 
the ways in which cyber-security concerns undermine traditional forms of safety 
engineering, for example by invalidating conventional forms of risk assessment.  
We also summarise the ways in which safety concerns frustrate the deployment of 
conventional mechanisms for cyber-security, including intrusion detection sys-
tems. 
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1 Introduction  
There is a growing threat to the cyber-security of safety-critical systems.   This 
is, in part, due to the integration of a small number of Commercial off the Shelf 
(COTS) products across the supply chain of national critical infrastructures.  In 
previous generations, critical infrastructures tended to rely on bespoke systems 
that were not reused across different industries (Johnson, 2015).    Now COTS 
components in safety-related applications include, but are not limited to, Linux, 
VOIP and Satellite/Ground Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) such as WAAS 
in North America and EGNOS in Europe. A growing number of potential attack-
ers have the technical knowledge to undermine safety-related applications across 
the transportation, energy distribution, food and water industries, etc.    
At the same time, we have seen the rise of a new generation of terrorist threats, 
based around semi-stable regimes that resemble nation states.   These regimes 
have access to trained engineers and process equipment within their borders.   
State-like terrorist regimes have become skilled in cyber-security, partly as a con-
sequence of the policies implemented by Western governments.   Police and intel-
ligence agencies have denied them access to conventional social media.  These 
regimes have responded by developing cryptographic skills and peer-to-peer net-
working using techniques originating with the deep or dark web.  This has con-
nected terrorist groups with strong political, religious and ideological motivation 
to the semi-commercial hackers who already sell zero-day exploits, malware li-
braries and root kits.  
A key theme in this paper is that neither government nor private industry has 
moved at the rate required to maintain our defences against the growing threats 
from cyber-criminals and terrorist states.   Public-private partnerships have failed 
to deliver regulatory guidance and appropriate audit mechanisms.  The fiscal crisis 
prevented many safety regulators from recruiting and retaining staff with suffi-
cient expertise in both cyber-security and safety-applications.   Cultural and or-
ganizational barriers between safety and security have compounded this.   It takes 
time before someone with a deep knowledge of conventional cyber-security can 
also gain an understanding of the concerns that arise, for instance in the nuclear or 
aviation industries.   This is important when cyber-security techniques cannot 
simply be transferred from more conventional office based systems to safety-
critical environments.    
Political and organizational barriers also help to explain our limited progress in 
securing national critical infrastructures.  These barriers arise because different 
regulators are responsible for the cyber-security of national data networks and for 
the safety of particular industries.  In the UK, this is illustrated by the distinction 
between OFCOM, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructures and the 
Civil Aviation Authority or the Office for Nuclear Regulation.  In the United 
States, similar distinctions arise between the Federal Communications Commis-
Why We Cannot (Yet) Ensure the Cyber-Security of Safety-Critical Systems   173 
  
sion, the Department for Homeland Security and the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, not to forget the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) as the body responsible for the Federal cyber-
security provisions within the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA), or the host of local and State organizations that may also be included as 
stakeholders.  These organizational and political distinctions create significant 
practical consequences. Companies often do not understand their reporting obliga-
tions for cyber incidents across national and international agencies, including 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTS), police, intelligence and critical 
infrastructure organizations, as well as telecoms and industry regulators.  This 
situation is compounded when superficial similarities between safety and security 
have led to the development of inappropriate policies that cannot be sustained 
using existing engineering practice.  The following pages focus on two classes of 
concern.  Firstly, there are situations in which cyber-security concerns undermine 
existing safety practices:  
 
• Conventional safety risk assessments cannot be sustained when systems 
might be exposed to coordinated and malicious attacks; 
 
•  Existing safety-management systems offer limited support for cyber-
security – especially given differences in incident reporting and root 
cause analysis between these two areas; 
 
• Cyber-security concerns challenge many existing safety-related software 
engineering techniques, for instance, the use of software diversity and N-
version programming lead to extended supply chains that are difficult if 
not impossible to secure. 
 
The second, inverse set of concerns arise when safety issues complicate the appli-
cation of existing cyber-security techniques: 
 
• The limitations of conventional intrusion detection systems.  White list 
enumerations of permitted processes cannot easily be applied to complex 
legacy systems and there are dangers when valid, safety-related processes 
are denied necessary resource.  In contrast, black list enumerations of 
malware do not work because of the failure of cyber incident reporting in 
safety-related systems, noted in the previous section; 
 
• The limitations of conventional forensic techniques.   Existing support 
tends to focus on Internet Protocol related systems rather than on indus-
trial Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) infrastructures 
using very different Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and proto-
cols.   Further concerns stem from the competing risks that arise when 
deciding to either immediate isolate a compromised system leaving ap-
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plication processes in a potentially unsafe state or in continuing to oper-
ate until shut-down but with the risk of over-writing critical evidence; 
 
• The limitations of conventional cyber-security policies for air-gapped 
SCADA systems.  For control systems, where many devices are not net-
worked the implementation of conventional security patching policies 
may arguably increase rather than decrease potential vulnerabilities. 
2 The Failure of Safety Critical Techniques in Cyber Security 
The introduction has argued that we are ill-prepared to face a growing range of 
threats against the COTS infrastructures that support many safety-critical indus-
tries. Later sections will explain why a range of existing cyber-security techniques 
cannot easily be applied in safety-related domains.  In contrast, this section ex-
plains why safety-techniques are often compromised by cyber-security concerns. 
2.1 Cyber-threats Undermine Safety Risk Assessments 
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA, 2006) and the 
European Air Traffic Management Organisation (EUROCONTROL, 2006) advo-
cate the use of safety management concepts to support the cyber-security of criti-
cal infrastructures (Johnson, 2015).  In conventional applications, safety manage-
ment systems use incident reporting and other forms of operational monitoring to 
determine whether an implemented system meets the safety requirements derived 
form an initial risk assessment.   If new forms of hazard emerge, or if the system 
failed to adequately mitigate an identified risk, then further development is re-
quired.   In other words, risk assessment, design and operation, monitoring and 
incident reporting form a virtuous circle.    
These components of safety management systems also provide the foundations 
of information security management systems.  Risk assessment helps to identify 
threats and vulnerabilities.  Appropriate design and operating procedures help to 
ensure that the threats are mitigated.   Incident reporting and audit provide the 
feedback necessary to revise the initial risk assessments when new threats emerge 
and to identify any situations in which operations fail to meet the requirements 
derived from an initial risk assessment.  In theory, the use of similar concepts 
should support the integration of safety and information security management 
systems.  Unfortunately, these superficial similarities hide a host of differences 
that undermine attempts to transfer the benefits of safety management systems 
into the security domain, revealing the lack of engineering expertise and opera-
tional experience that has informed much previous guidance (Johnson, 2015a).  
For example, the presence of an intelligent adversary undermines independence 
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assumptions in conventional safety assessments. Blended attacks are timed to co-
incide with routine component failures.  Similarly, if the symptoms of one form of 
cyber attack are identified then it is very likely that a system may have been com-
promised in other ways. 
Cyber-security concerns undermine existing safety engineering practices in 
other ways.   Not only do they challenge the probabilistic components of risk as-
sessment, cyber-threats also undermine safety-related consequence assessments.  
One reason is that we have limited experience of the new forms of advanced per-
sistent threat, such as the state machine that varied the behaviour of Stuxnet or the 
use of Command and Control servers to hide Duqu from intrusion detection sys-
tems.  This makes it very dangerous to predict the potential outcome from future 
modes of attack.  The growing interconnection of critical infrastructure leads to 
hidden interdependencies.  There are also concerns over ‘cyber-storms’ where a 
single attack brings down many different infrastructures – for instance when criti-
cal systems run under the same variant of Linux or where multiple services de-
pend on timing information from the same satellite infrastructures. 
None of these caveats would be significant if we had a range of tools and tech-
niques that could be used to combine conventional safety risk assessments and 
cyber-threat analysis. Fault trees have superficial similarities to attack trees but the 
underlying semantics are different.   In consequence, many organisations end up 
with parallel systems that are incapable of transferring lessons between safety and 
security.  There are some notable exceptions (Piètre-Cambacédès and Bouissou 
2010, Johnson, 2015).  However, there are few published case studies in integrat-
ed approaches to safety and security and even less agreement over the general 
utility of these tools across different industries. 
2.2 Cyber-threats Challenge Safety Incident Reporting 
It has taken many years to establish strong incident reporting cultures across safe-
ty-critical industries.   In contrast, very few companies have the same security 
reporting culture.  One reason for this is that employees reporting safety concerns 
are typically protected by a ‘no blame’ or ‘proportionate blame’ environment.  In 
contrast, security violations can trigger disciplinary or legal action against other 
employees.   A mismatch between security policy and practices can undermine a 
nascent reporting culture. Management implicitly approve of many security viola-
tions, for example the use of USB devices by sub-contractors, because they are 
anxious to maintain operations.  Such incidents are seldom reported.  
Many companies are reluctant to report incidents to Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Teams (CERTs), regulatory agencies or industry associations. The loss of 
control and the reliance on external agencies can also compromise intellectual 
property where investigators must be familiar with commercially sensitive infor-
mation in order to diagnose the causes of an attack.   There are also political con-
176   Johnson 
 
cerns over the exchange of information about cyber-security incidents across na-
tional borders, even to otherwise friendly states. 
Further barriers prevent the use of incident reporting to support safety and 
cyber-security. Lessons learned applications ensure that safety recommendations 
are disseminated as widely as possible.  The aim is to avoid any recurrence of po-
tential accidents.   However, the disclosure of information about a cyber-incident 
might encourage future attacks.  It can undermine market confidence; it can trig-
ger regulatory action and litigation.  
While there are well-established reporting mechanisms for safety concerns, 
cyber-incident reporting has been undermined by a series of ‘turf wars’ across 
Europe and North America.   For many companies, it can be unclear whether re-
ports should be sent to an industry regulator, such as the US Federal Aviation 
Administration or Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to a security agency, such as 
the Department of Homeland Security, or the US CERT, or to telecoms regulators 
who have responsibility for collating information about wider cyber-security con-
cerns, such as the Federal Communications Commission.  In some cases, a single 
incident must be reported to more than one agency.   For example, in the UK a 
cyber-attack with safety related consequences must be reported to the national 
industry safety regulator and potentially also to a subset of the National Crime 
Agency, the National Cyber Crime Unit, GOVCERT, the UK Information Com-
missioner as well as the CESG/Centre for the Protection of National Critical Infra-
structure via providers registered under the Cyber Incident Response (CIR) or the 
Cyber Security Incident Response Scheme (CSIR).  
2.3 Cyber-security Undermines Safety-Critical Development 
The tensions between safety and security extend across the engineering lifecycle, 
from risk assessment to detailed development practices. For instance, redundancy 
is typically used to increase the dependability of critical systems.   If one compo-
nent fails then a backup can maintain operation.  However, this provides few ben-
efits in software related systems without some level of diversity.   Two redundant 
versions of the same code are likely to contain the same bugs and hence will fail 
in the same way, even if they are provided with slightly different data.   In conse-
quence, N-version programming techniques rely on using two or more contractors 
to develop multiple versions of the same program.  In the event that one fails, it is 
intended that the other will not.  The use of a diverse supply chain helps to ensure 
that both programs do not share common bugs, assuming that their requirements 
are correct.  
Unfortunately, software diversity creates immediate problems for security 
management.    The end user must secure two or more different supply chains – in 
other words, redundant diversity opens up multiple routes through which com-
promised code might be integrated into a safety-critical system.   The customer 
must audit multiple sub-contractors to ensure that they meet agreed cyber-security 
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requirements. These security concerns are seldom considered in safety-critical 
software development.  Customers have few guarantees that suppliers have vetted 
their staff, have prevented the introduction of code from untrusted sources, etc.   
The meta-level point is that integrating safety and security reveals a host of 
tensions, which can only be addressed through integration.   Without this, we can-
not assume that the two isolated communities will deliver viable solutions to the 
problems identified in this paper.   For example, a small number of safety-critical 
companies are now offering diverse supply chains from within their own organiza-
tion.  In other words, they will provide customers with two pieces of software 
each performing very similar functions but with assurances that they were imple-
mented by different teams of employees using diverse development methods.  
This simplifies the supply chain but relies upon a range of innovative software 
management and development practices.   It remains to be seen whether such 
practices are strong enough to address the natural safety concerns that arise when 
redundant software comes from the same supplier. 
3 The Failures of Safety Techniques in Cyber-Security 
The previous section has argued that there is an urgent need for integrated tools 
and expertise because safety-techniques are often compromised by the introduc-
tion of cyber-security concerns.  In contrast, the following paragraphs argue that 
existing cyber-security policies cannot easily be applied in safety-related domains.  
We focus on three examples: 
 
1. Conventional intrusion detection systems undermine the safety of com-
plex applications;    
2. Secondly, existing forensic guidance for conventional office based sys-
tems would lead to loss of life in safety-critical systems; 
3. Finally, the air-gapped architectures of many SCADA environments un-
dermine existing principles of security management. 
3.1 Safety Concerns Limit Cyber-Intrusion Detection Systems 
NIST (2012) advocate the use of several different intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) within critical applications.  This raises significant concerns when an IDS 
might erroneously block critical processes in safety-related applications.  There 
are two main approaches to intrusion detection. Blacklisting relies on detecting the 
characteristics of malware.   Whitelisting is discussed in subsequent sections and 
relies on recognizing approved code.  
Most blacklist IDS are designed to protect office-based systems.  The signa-
tures and symptoms of malware are compiled from evidence about incidents re-
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ported through a range of mechanisms, including honey pots (Spitzner, 2002) but 
also through confidential reporting to the major security companies.   Section 2.2 
summarized the barriers that prevent the exchange of information about cyber 
incidents in safety-critical systems.  Unless we can identify the malware signa-
tures that characterize the growing threat to industrial control systems then at-
tempts to develop blacklist IDS will provide very limited protection for SCADA 
applications (Naedele, 2007). 
In order to protect a system, it is important to update a blacklist as soon as a 
malware signature has been identified.  However, this creates problems in safety-
related applications where there are requirements to conduct exhaustive tests prior 
to any software modifications.  Uploading a corrupted blacklist could also cause 
the failure of a detection system with knock-on consequences for safety-related 
processes.  Safety engineers would face a difficult decision between the compet-
ing requirement to update blacklists as soon as a new signature was identified and 
the requirement to ensure that the new signature did not undermine the safety of 
application processes. 
In contrast to blacklisting, whitelist IDS ensure that only approved programs 
can be executed.  They profile and report any deviations from ‘normal behavior’. 
This can be implemented by creating a hash digest of all software applications. If 
the hash of an executable does not match anything in the list, it will trigger a secu-
rity event.  It is also important to prevent unauthorized users from changing the 
lists indicating which files can be executed. 
Whitelisting offers benefits for safety-critical applications.   The focus on iden-
tifying ‘normal processes’ eliminates the need to continually update malware sig-
natures.   Whitelists provide some protection against zero-day exploits – even if 
the signature of an attack is unknown, the malicious code will not be included on 
the approved hash list.  However, the application of this approach raises a number 
of concerns.  For instance, the same attack across multiple instances of a control 
system will simultaneously lead to a large number of distributed security events. 
These can overwhelm an organization’s ability to respond in a timely fashion and 
may also be triggered by non-malicious causes. Software updates that are not re-
flected by changes in the whitelist can lead to a large number of false positives.  
Safety-critical processes could be denied computational resources.   It, therefore, 
becomes imperative that staff and sub-contractors follow agreed security update 
procedures during all software installations.  In some safety-critical applications 
this is relatively straightforward – for instance in long-lived SCADA systems 
where software updates on PLCs are relatively rare.  In other contexts, such as air 
traffic management, where tens of sub-contractors each have intellectual property 
concerns, it can be very hard to determine what is and what is not a ‘normal pro-
cess’.  
Data diodes ensure that information can only travel in one direction; for in-
stance, by removing the send and receive transceivers from one direction of a fi-
ber-optic cable.  They can be used so that process data only flows from an opera-
tional zone to business systems but not vice versa. These devices can also isolate 
IDS from critical processes. The uni-directional flow of data reduces concerns that 
Why We Cannot (Yet) Ensure the Cyber-Security of Safety-Critical Systems   179 
  
the detection system will have an adverse effect on application safety. Unfortu-
nately, greater levels of monitoring lead to an increasing number of false alarms.  
This can undermine cyber situation awareness and can lead to denial of service 
when operators incorrectly halt an application that they fear has been compro-
mised.   In contrast, raising IDS tolerance thresholds increase the potential for 
missed positives.   In safety-critical systems this leads to the possibility that the 
over-tolerant configuration of an IDS allows companies to continue operating with 
malware inside critical applications.  In conventional office-based systems, ma-
chine-learning techniques have been successfully deployed with threat visualiza-
tion to integrate automated intrusion detection with human decision-making.   
Further work is required to determine whether these approaches might also be 
adapted to address the false-positive/false-negative concerns that undermine 
cyber-situation awareness in safety-critical systems. 
3.2 Safety in Air Gapped Systems Undermines Cyber Policies 
Most existing cyber-security tools and techniques focus on distributed architec-
tures that are based around the conventional IP-stack.   In contrast, many safety-
related applications rely on computational devices such as PLCs that are isolated 
even from local area networks. The behavior of monitoring and control applica-
tions may not change for over a decade.  The ‘air gap’ between the device and any 
network improves the cyber-security of safety-critical applications because it lim-
its the opportunities for remote attacks.   However, the ‘air gap’ also limits oppor-
tunities to use blacklist IDS.   There is no easy way for system administrators to 
automatically update nodes with malware signatures. Operators must manually 
install any updates on each isolated device across the plant.   This leads to a para-
dox.   It is hard for any attacker to compromise a stand-alone PLC unless it is 
hooked to another device – for example to install a patch or update the IDS.   The 
more often these updates occur then the greater the risk of cross-contamination.  
Systems managers of safety-critical systems, therefore, often deliberately ignore 
conventional cyber-security advice, preferring to leave isolated devices unpatched.  
Other problems limit the application of whitelisting in air-gapped systems.  With-
out network access, it may be weeks or months before an engineer can examine 
the logs in sufficient detail to note an infection on a remote device.  
3.3 Safety Concerns Undermine Conventional Cyber-Forensics 
Detailed guidelines cover the forensic analysis of cyber-security incidents.  For 
example, the US Department of Justice (2004, 2008) suggest that forensic investi-
gators must preserve the ‘chain of evidence’: 
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• “Immediately secure all electronic devices, including personal or portable 
devices. 
• Ensure that no unauthorized person has access to any electronic devices at the 
crime scene. 
• Refuse offers of help or technical assistance from any unauthorized persons. 
• Remove all persons from the crime scene or the immediate area from which 
evidence is to be collected. 
• Ensure that the condition of any electronic device is not altered. 
• STOP! Leave a computer or electronic device off if it is already turned off”. 
 
These principles support cyber forensics in office-based systems.   They also illus-
trate the problems of integrating existing security practices into safety-critical sys-
tems.   It is hard to envisage how any investigatory agency could immediately 
secure “all electronic devices” distributed across a compromised process control 
system, or indeed how to enumerate all of the devices connected to a modern, na-
tional air traffic management system.  Many safety-critical companies have mini-
mal access control policies, so that it is not always clear to external agencies who 
exactly has authorized access to the devices at a crime scene.   Typically, there are 
strong forms of perimeter access – where only staff and authorized sub-contractors 
can gain access to a facility or machine room but once inside they have wide-
ranging access to racks and network components.  This is a strong contrast with 
financial institutions and even web service providers where it is normal to have 
fine grained access control policies that prohibit software engineers from access-
ing a machine room.   Removing “all persons from the crime scene” could be cat-
astrophic in a crowded Air Traffic Control centre or nuclear control room where 
operations, engineering and safety management must cooperate during contingen-
cy operations, including the aftermath of a cyber-attack. To “leave a computer or 
electronic device off if it is already turned off” would prevent the use of redundant 
protection systems.  
The Department of Justice guidelines aim to preserve evidence by urging in-
vestigators to turn off any compromised systems.  Continued operation may over-
write valuable data or enable attackers to disguise the manner in which a system 
was compromised.  However immediately isolating a safety-critical system might 
endanger the lives of the public and of operators.  Starting a fallback system can 
reduce this risk until an application reaches a safe state.  However, this increases 
the risk of cross-contamination.  In other words, halting a primary application to 
preserve forensic data can lead to the infection of the secondary system at a time 
when engineers and investigators are unlikely to know the mechanisms by which 
an attack was originally propagated.  Without some form of integration, it is im-
possible for operational staff, senior management and investigatory agencies to 
balance the risks between the safety of application processes, the potential for 
cross-contamination and the legal requirements to preserve the evidence necessary 
for prosecutions in the aftermath of an attack. 
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4 Conclusions and Further Work 
We face a growing range of cyber-threats to safety-critical systems. State-like 
terrorist groups have access to significant finance and engineering resources.   The 
threats to safety-critical systems also stem from commercial markets in malware 
through the peer-to-peer networks of the Dark/Deep web where zero day exploits 
can be bought by those lacking the technical skills necessary to develop them.  At 
the same time our vulnerabilities are increasing – through the integration of COTS 
applications including Linux, Voice over IP (VOIP) and Satellite Based Augmen-
tation Systems into safety critical applications.  The public-private partnerships 
established to enhance cyber-security have done little to address these concerns 
partly because the fiscal crisis and organizational barriers have left us without 
regulators who are competent in the cyber-security of safety-critical applications.   
Superficial similarities between safety and security have led to the development 
of policies that cannot be sustained using existing engineering techniques. There 
are unique concerns for safety that prevent us from simply re-using existing guid-
ance from office based systems in the aftermath of cyber-attacks. We cannot im-
mediately isolate safety-related processes during forensic investigations without 
risking the lives of those who depend on critical infrastructures.  Similarly, we 
cannot reuse convention Intrusion Detection Systems if these applications could 
block critical processes or if updates to malware signatures inadvertently bring 
down safety-related systems.    
There are many areas for further work, including the causal analysis of cyber-
incidents in safety-critical systems.  Systemic factors help create the context in 
which an incident or accident is likely to undermine the safety of application pro-
cesses.  In contrast, security investigations tend to focus more on deliberate or 
unwitting violations. This focus on the direct human causes of a security incident 
is similar to the ‘perfective approach’ that characterized safety-related reporting 
more than a decade ago (Johnson, 2003).  We might, therefore, expect that the 
focus of security investigations to shift towards systemic factors in the future.   
For this to happen it seems likely that we will need a new generation of root cause 
analysis techniques.  Most existing approaches use counter-factual reasoning in 
the aftermath of safety-related incidents.   Recommendations are derived by iden-
tifying causes, which had they been prevented then the incident would not have 
occurred.   Such reasoning cannot easily be applied to cyber-attacks.  It is hard to 
argue that a security incident would have been prevented given that adversaries 
launch multiple, simultaneous attacks, some of which go undetected.   
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